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State v. Jones: Double Jeopardy and Substantial Rights
in North Carolina Appeals
Both the law of the land clause of the North Carolina Constitution' and the
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution2 guarantee that no person
may be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.3 North Carolina courts have
regarded the right to be free from double jeopardy as "a fundamental and sacred
principle of the common law,"'4 an "integral part of the 'law of the land.' ,,5
Nevertheless, the North Carolina Court of Appeals' recent decision in State v.
Jones6 makes it clear that however "sacred," "fundamental," "integral," and
constitutional the right may be, it is not a "substantial" right for the purposes of
an appeal under section 1-277 of the North Carolina General Statutes. 7 Conse-
quently, the court held that the defendant in Jones had no right to the immediate
appeal of an interlocutory orders that denied his motion to dismiss the indict-
ment against him on double jeopardy grounds.9
On April 13, 1981, Andrew Lynn Jones was indicted for the murder of
1. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19, provides: "No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of
his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life,
liberty, or property, but by the law of the land." This clause has been interpreted as protecting
persons from being tried or punished twice for the same offense, although it does not explicitly
prohibit double jeopardy. See State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 231 S.E.2d 833 (1977); State v. Crocker,
239 N.C. 446, 80 S.E.2d 243 (1954) (prohibition against double jeopardy regarded as integral part of
the law of the land).
2. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "No person shall... be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
double jeopardy clause of the federal Constitution was made applicable to the states by the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
In Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978), the Supreme Court reviewed the purposes behind
the double jeopardy clause:
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy unequivocally prohibits a second
trial following an acquittal. The public interest in the finality of criminal judgments is so
strong that an acquitted defendant may not be retried even though "the acquittal was
based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation"....
Because jeopardy attaches before the judgment becomes final, the constitutional pro-
tection also embraces the defendant's "valued right to have his trial completed by a partic-
ular tribunal."... Even if the first trial is not completed, a second prosecution may be
grossly unfair. It increases the financial and emotional burden on the accused, prolongs
the period in which he is stigmatized by an unresolved accusation of wrongdoing, and may
even enhance the risk that an innocent defendant may be convicted.
Id. at 503-04.
3. Jeopardy attaches in North Carolina when a defendant in a criminal prosecution is placed
on trial: (1) on a valid indictment or information; (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3)
after arraignment; (4) after plea; and (5) when a competent jury has been impaneled and sworn to
make a true deliverance of the case. State v. Crocker, 239 N.C. 446, 449, 80 S.E.2d 243, 245 (1954).
4. Id. at 449, 80 S.E.2d at 245.
5. Id.
6. 67 N.C. App. 413, 313 S.E.2d 264 (1984).
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277 (1983) provides that "[ain appeal may be taken from every judi-
cial order or determination . . . which affects a substantial right claimed in any action or
proceeding."
8. An interlocutory order is an order that does not determine the issues but directs some
further proceeding preliminary to a final decree. Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200,
207, 240 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978).
9. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 416, 313 S.E.2d at 266-67.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
David Lee Height. 10 The first of Jones' three trials based on this indictment was
declared a mistrial." Before the start of his second trial for the same offense,
Jones moved to dismiss the indictment against him on double jeopardy grounds,
arguing that the judge in his first trial had improperly declared a mistrial.1 2 The
judge presiding over Jones' second trial denied the motion and refused to stay
the second trial pending the outcome of Jones' appeal.1 3 Jones' second trial also
ended in a mistrial. 14 At Jones' third trial for the same offense, he finally was
convicted of second degree murder. 15
Following his conviction, Jones appealed the second trial court's denial of
his pretrial motion to dismiss. He argued that he had a constitutional right to
immediate appeal of the order based on the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Abney v. United States16 and that under North Carolina General Statutes
section 1-277 the trial court's order denying his motion for dismissal was imme-
diately appealable because it affected a substantial right. 17
The North Carolina Court of Appeals found that Jones did not have a con-
stitutional right to immediate appeal.18 In distinguishing Abney, the court
found that the Supreme Court was merely interpreting the federal jurisdictional
statute and not the federal Constitution when it held that the Abney defendant
had a right to immediate appeal of an interlocutory order denying his motion to
dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. 19 Interpreting the corresponding North
Carolina jurisdictional statutes, sections 7A-2720 and 1-277,21 the court of ap-
peals in Jones found that there was no right to immediate appeal of an interlocu-
10. Id. at 413, 313 S.E.2d at 265.
11. Id. Judge Britt, presiding over the case, found that the jury was deadlocked. The defend-
ant immediately fied objections to the order of mistrial. State v. Jones, 67 N.C. App. 377, 380, 313
S.E.2d 808, 811 (1984) (separate appeal from conviction at third trial).
12. State v. Jones, 67 N.C. App. 377, 380, 313 S.E.2d 808, 811 (1984). The defendant asserted
that the judge's declaration of a mistrial had been provoked by actions of the prosecutor and that the
judge had failed to make either a judicial inquiry or finding of fact as to whether the jury actually
was deadlocked. Id. at 386, 313 S.E.2d at 814. When a trial court makes no findings in the process
of improperly ordering a mistrial over the defendant's objection, the defendant cannot be retried for
the same offense. Id. at 388, 313 S.E.2d at 815-16.
13. Following the original trial court's order of a mistrial, defendant petitioned that court for
habeas corpus relief. The trial court denied defendant's petition. Jones then petitioned the North
Carolina Supreme Court for writs of supersedeas, habeas corpus, and mandamus. See infra note 24
for a discussion of these and other prerogative writs. The supreme court vacated Judge Britt's order
of mistrial and remanded the case to the superior court for a de novo hearing on defendant's motion
for habeas corpus relief before a different judge. Judge Bailey, presiding over the de novo hearing,
denied defendant's petition for habeas corpus. Defendant then petitioned the North Carolina
Supreme Court for writs of supersedeas and certiorari, but both writs were denied. Defendant filed
similar motions in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, but
did not succeed in preventing his retrial. State v. Jones, 67 N.C. App. 377, 381, 313 S.E.2d 808, 811
(1984).
14. State v. Jones, 67 N.C. App. 377, 380, 313 S.E.2d 808, 811 (1984). A mistrial was granted
on defendant's motion.
15. Id.
16. 431 U.S. 651 (1977). The Court inAbney held that an order denying a motion to dismiss on
double jeopardy grounds was a final decision within the federal jurisdictional statute and was imme-
diately appealable under the statute. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
17. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 415-16, 313 S.E.2d at 266.
18. Id. at 416, 313 S.E.2d at 266.
19. Id. at 415, 313 S.E.2d at 266.
20. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27 (1981). Although the court did not cite any specific subsection of
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tory order unless the order would deprive the appellant of a substantial right if
not reviewed before a final judgment on the merits.22 Referring to two decisions
of the North Carolina Supreme Court, the court in Jones determined that the
right to avoid a rehearing or trial was not substantial within the meaning of the
statute.2 3 The court then reasoned that Jones' asserted right to avoid a second
trial also was not substantial. The court added that the defendant's right to
interlocutory review was adequately protected by his opportunity to obtain dis-
cretionary review in the appellate courts by means of prerogative writs.24
Judge Johnson dissented from the panel decision on two grounds. First, he
contended that the "final decision" requirement of the federal jurisdictional stat-
ute was substantially similar to the "final judgment" requirement in the North
Carolina appellate statute;2 5 thus, the holding in Abney was equally applicable to
North Carolina law.2 6 Second, Judge Johnson criticized the majority for basing
its decision solely on the authority of civil cases;27 he-argued that the cases relied
on were inapplicable and that an important case involving rights substantially
similar to those asserted by Jones had been overlooked.2 8
§ 7A-27, it appeared to be referring to the final judgment rule in § 7A-27(b) which allows appeals of
right to the court of appeals "flrom any final judgment of a superior court." Id. § 7A-27(b).
21. See supra note 7.
22. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 415, 313 S.E.2d at 266 (citing Blackwelder v. Department of
Human Resources, 60 N.C. App. 331, 299 S.E.2d 777 (1983)).
Jones appealed separately from the conviction entered at his third trial. See State v. Jones, 67
N.C. App. 377, 313 S.E.2d 808 (1984). The court of appeals in that case determined that the trial
judge in the original trial had improperly declared a mistrial, because the judge had failed to make a
judicial inquiry or finding of fact as to whether the jury actually was deadlocked. The court of
appeals then held that "where the trial court makes no findings at all in the course of improperly
ordering a mistrial over defendant's timely objection... the defendant cannot be tried again for the
same offense." Id. at 388, 313 S.E.2d at 815-16.
23. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 415, 313 S.E.2d at 266.
24. Id. Prerogative writs are extraordinary writs issued in the discretion of the court on a
showing of proper cause. Among the prerogative writs authorized for issuance by the court of ap-
peals or the supreme court under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-32 (1981) are:
1) Certiorari, which allows the appellant to seek review of a case that would not otherwise be
entitled to review. Certiorari may be issued by the court of appeals or supreme court in situations in
which the right to appeal or petition for discretionary review has been lost by appellant's failure to
take timely action, or in which no right to appeal exists from an interlocutory order.
2) Supersedeas, which is used to stay the enforcement of an order while review of that order is
being sought.
3) Mandamus, which is used to correct erroneous judicial action, to compel judicial action that
erroneously has been refused, or to compel the exercise of judicial discretion when discretionary
action has been refused. See J. POTrER, NORTH CAROLINA APPELLATE HANDBOOK 49-53 (1978).
Section 7A-32 also authorizes the court of appeals or supreme court to issue the writ of habeas
corpus which is a writ "designed as an effective means of obtaining'. . . a speedy release of persons
who are illegally deprived of their liberty or illegally detained."' In re Stevens, 28 N.C. App. 471,
473, 221 S.E.2d 839, 840 (1976) (quoting 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus § 1 (1968)).
25. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 418, 313 S.E.2d at 267 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
26. Id. It is unclear whether Judge Johnson was suggesting that Jones had a constitutional
right to appeal on these facts or whether he was objecting merely to the majority's cursory treatment
of Abney.
27. Id. at 418, 313 S.E.2d at 268 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Given the scarcity of criminal cases
involving interlocutory appeals, see infra note 91 and accompanying text, the dissent's criticism may
be unwarranted.
28. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 418, 313 S.E.2d at 268 (Johnson, J., dissenting); see infra notes 92-93
and accompanying text.
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This Note considers the propriety of the court of appeals' decision in Jones
in light of the history of the substantial rights doctrine and evaluates the at-
tempts of federal and state courts to balance the competing interests of judicial
efficiency and individual rights. It concludes that although the court may have
been correct in not relying on federal law, North Carolina precedent and policy
dictate reversal of the decision.
Before considering the substantial rights doctrine, it is necessary to examine
the rule that created the need for the substantial rights doctrine exception. The
final judgment rule was developed over three hundred years ago in Metcalfe's
Case29 in which the King's Bench held that no appeal could be taken until an
action had been disposed of completely.30 The rule grew out of the common-law
conviction that a case was a single judicial unit and that it was impossible to
have two records in different courts upon the same original writ. 31 Today the
rule is based on the desire for judicial economy; it allows appellate courts to
consider the entire case at once, thus avoiding the inequities inherent in piece-
meal review.3 2
All too often individual rights were lost in the common-law quest for judi-
cial economy.33 The substantial rights doctrine thus evolved to relieve some of
the hardships of the final judgment rule; the doctrine allows immediate appeal to
be taken from any interlocutory judgment that has affected a substantial right of
a litigant.34 The doctrine first appeared in New York's Field Code, which
merged the final judgment rule of the common law with the liberal appeals poli-
cies of the courts of equity.35 North Carolina adopted the substantial rights
doctrine when it enacted its own Code of Civil Procedure based upon the Field
Code.3 6
The doctrine remained part of North Carolina law even after the state
adopted new rules of civil procedure based on the federal rules. Even though the
federal rules did not explicitly provide for a substantial rights exception to the
final judgment rule37 and the substantial rights doctrine itself did not otherwise
29. 77 Eng. Rep. 1193, 11 Coke 28 (1615).
30. See Comment, Interlocutory Appeals in North Carolina: The Substantial Right Doctrine, 18
WAKE FoREsr L. REv. 857, 858 (1982).
31. See Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L. J. 539, 541-42 (1932);
Frank, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TEx. L. REv. 292, 292 (1966).
32. Frank, supra note 31, at 292.
33. Id. at 292 & n.10.
34. See Comment, supra note 30, at 857.
35. N.Y. CIV. PROC. LAW § 5701(a)(2)(v) (McKinney 1978) (first modem code of civil proce-
dure). Although the common law strictly had adhered to the final judgment rule, courts of equity
generally allowed appeals from nonfinal orders and decrees. See Comment, supra note 30, at 858.
36. See N.C. CODE CIV. PROC. LAW § 299 (1868) ("An appeal may be taken from every judi-
cial order or determination of a judge of a superior court . . . which affects a substantial right
claimed in any action or proceeding . ), repealed by Act of April 30, 1971, ch. 268, § 34, 1971
N.C. Sess. Laws 199.
37. Although the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically provide for a
substantial rights exception, the doctrine is part of the North Carolina General Statutes. See supra
note 7; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(d)(1) (1981) (providing for appeal as of right "from any
interiocutory order or judgment of a superior court or district court in a civil action or proceeding
which... affects a substantial right").
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become part of the federal law, 38 the federal system developed other exceptions,
four judicial and four legislative, to the final judgment rule.3 9 It was one of the
judicially created exceptions, the collateral order doctrine,43 that formed the ba-
sis for the Supreme Court's decision in Abney v. United States.4 1
The Supreme Court developed the collateral order doctrine in Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.42 Cohen involved a shareholder's derivative
suit in which the district court had denied defendant corporation's motion to
require plaintiff shareholders to post security to cover the cost of the litigation. 43
Defendant in Cohen had sought immediate review in the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, which reversed the decision of the district court.44 On review of the
appellate court's decision, the Supreme Court held that the pretrial order of the
district court was a "final decision" for the purposes of the federal appellate
jurisdiction statute.45 In determining that the pretrial order was a final decision
within the statute, the Court looked to three factors:
(1) whether the order fully disposed of the security issue;46
(2) whether the order constituted a resolution of an issue completely collat-
eral to the rights asserted in the actions or was merely a "step toward final
disposition of the merits"; 47 and
38. See Comment, supra note 30, at 859.
39. See id. The four legislative exceptions to the final judgment rule are: 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1) (1982), which provides for immediate appeal to the court of appeals of interlocutory
injunctive orders; 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982), which authorizes federal courts to issue writs of man-
damus (North Carolina has a corollary to § 1651(a) in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-32(b) (1981), which
authorizes the court of appeals and supreme court to issue writs of mandamus); FED. R. Civ. P.
54(b) which allows appellate review of final judgments entered against fewer than all the parties or
claims in a multiparty or multiclaim action (N.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b) parallels the federal rule except to
the extent that it is limited by the North Carolina General Statutes); and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982),
which allows discretionary review of cases involving a controlling question of law about which there
is substantial ground for difference of opinion and where the resolution of such an issue will materi-
ally advance the ultimate disposition of the litigation.
The four judicial exceptions to the final judgment rule are: the irreparable harm doctrine for-
mulated in Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848), which permits immediate appeal of an
order directing delivery of physical property when such an appeal is necessary to prevent irreparable
injury to appellant's interests; the collateral order doctrine, see infra notes 42-49 and accompanying
text; the death knell doctrine, which authorized appeal from an interlocutory order that has the
effect of terminating the litigation (in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978) the Court
put an end to the use of this doctrine in the federal courts); and the pragmatic balancing test formu-
lated in Gillespie v. United States, 379 U.S. 148 (1964), which allows appeal of nonfinal orders that
are fundamental to the furtherance of the litigation. See generally 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION, §§ 3910-13 (1976) (comprehensive
discussion of federal exceptions to final judgment rule).
40. See generally Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 657-59 (1977) (discussing development
and application of collateral order doctrine); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 39,
§ 3911, at 467 (same); Frank, supra note 31, at 300-02 (same); Note, Appealability in the Federal
Courts, 75 HARV. L. REv. 351, 364-67 (1961) (same).
41. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
42. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
43. Id. at 543.
44. Id. at 545.
45. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) provides: "The court of appeals. . . shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions.., except where direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."
46. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
47. Id.
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(3) whether the decision involved an important right that would be "lost,
probably irreparably," if review had to await a final judgment.48
After considering these factors, the Court concluded that the pretrial order in
Cohen fell within the "small class [of orders] which finally determine claims of
right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too impor-
tant to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that
appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." 49
In determining whether the pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss on
double jeopardy grounds belonged in the "small class" of Cohen orders, the
Supreme Court in Abney considered each of the three factors outlined in Co-
hen.50 The Court first found that the pretrial order constituted a final disposi-
tion of the double jeopardy claim, as no further steps could be taken in the trial
court to block the trial.5 1 Next, the Court determined that the double jeopardy
claim was collateral to and independent of the principal issue in a criminal trial,
as the claim was not relevant to defendant's guilt or innocence.5 2 Last, the
Court noted that the rights guaranteed by the double jeopardy clause would be
"significantly undermined" if the claim were postponed until after the defend-
ant's conviction.53 The Court noted that the denial of an interlocutory appeal in
this case would subject the defendant to the very "personal strain, public embar-
rassment, and expense of a criminal trial" from which the double jeopardy
clause was designed to protect him.54 Most significantly, the Court stated that
for the defendant to enjoy the "full protection" of the double jeopardy clause,
his double jeopardy challenge must be reviewable before he is exposed to a sec-
ond criminal trial. 55
Rather than requiring a "final decision" on a collateral issue as the basis for
interlocutory appeal, as does section 1291, North Carolina's statute allows an
appeal of right from "every judicial order or determination of a judge of a supe-
rior or district court. . . which affects a substantial right claimed in any action
or proceeding."'5 6 The North Carolina Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
have given the term "substantial right" differing, albeit consistent, definitions.
Relying on Webster's definition, the North Carolina Supreme Court has defined
48. Id.
49. Id. Other orders belonging to the small class defined by Cohen are: an order vacating ar
attachment in an admiralty appeal, the denial of a petition to proceed in forma pauperis, an ordet
challenging the amount of bail, and an order imposing on defendants 90% of costs of notifying clas
members of class action. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172 (1974) (class action)
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951) (bail); Roberts v. United States Dist. Court, 339 U.S. 844, 84!
(1950) (in forma pauperis); Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684
688-89 (1950) (attachment).
50. Abney, 431 U.S. at 659-62.
51. Id. at 659.
52. Id. at 659-60.
53. Id. at 660. The Court noted that the double jeopardy clause was designed to protect indi.
viduals not only from being convicted twice, but from being tried twice as well. Such protection
would be lost, the Court said, if the defendant were forced to "'run the gauntlet'" a second time
before an appeal could be taken. Id. at 660-62.
54. Id. at 661.
55. Id. at 662.
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277 (1983).
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a substantial right as "'a legal right affecting or invoking a matter of substance
as distinguished from matters of form: a right materially affecting those inter-
ests which a man is entitled to have preserved and protected by law: a material
right.' -57 The court of appeals has relied on Black's definition of substantial:
"'of real worth and importance: of considerable value, valuable.' "58 As one
commentator has noted, the term "substantial right" is best defined by
example.59
Among those orders that North Carolina courts have found to affect a sub-
stantial right are orders granting or denying injunctions, orders maintaining the
unity of adjudication, and orders concerning separation and divorce. 6° In the
case of injunctive orders, North Carolina's substantial rights doctrine is compa-
rable to the federal statute that allows immediate appeal of interlocutory injunc-
tive orders in the federal courts.6 1 In contrast to the federal statute, the
substantial rights doctrine authorizes appellate review only of those injunctive
orders that affect a substantial right instead of allowing appellate review of all
injunctions. 62 The right of a litigant to have all of his claims litigated in one suit
also has been considered substantial. 63 Thus, North Carolina courts have found
that an interlocutory order that prevents the complete adjudication of all of a
litigant's claims in one action is immediately appealable under the substantial
rights doctrine.64 Finally, North Carolina courts generally have found that or-
ders granting claims for alimony and child support arrearages, or granting full
faith and credit to another state's decree imposing one spouse's continuing sup-
port obligation, affect a substantial right.6 5
Prior to the North Carolina Court of Appeals' decision in Stephenson v.
Stephenson,66 North Carolina courts also had allowed immediate appeal of
awards pendente lite in alimony and divorce actions.67 Influenced by the back-
log of cases and the increased use of interlocutory appeals as delay tactics, the
court in Stephenson found that awards pendente lite do not "necessarily affect a
substantial right."' 68 Arguably, the Stephenson court's emphasis on the delay
57. Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 130, 225 S.E.2d 797, 805 (1976)
(quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2280 (1971)).
58. Setzer v. Annas, 21 N.C. App. 632, 634, 205 S.E.2d 553, 555 (1974) (quoting BLAcK's LAW
DICTIONARY 1597 (4th ed. 1968)), rev'd on other grounds, 286 N.C. 534, 212 S.E.2d 154 (1975).
59. See Comment, supra note 30, at 867.
60. See id. at 867-73.
61. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1982).
62. See Comment, supra note 30, at 868 ("[T]he advantage of the case-by-case substantial right
test [is] that it does not restrict the appellate courts to a black-letter rule requiring review of all
injunctions, but rather allows them to examine the particular facts and the individual rights involved
in deciding whether an immediate appeal should lie.").
63. Id. at 869.
64. See, eg., Hudspeth v. Bunzey, 35 N.C. App. 231, 241 S.E.2d 119 (denial of motion to
amend answer for purpose of asserting compulsory counterclaim affects a substantial right), disc. rev.
denied, 294 N.C. 736, 244 S.E.2d 154 (1978).
65. See McGinnis v. McGinnis, 44 N.C. App. 381, 387, 261 S.E.2d 491, 495 (1980).
66. 55 N.C. App. 250, 285 S.E.2d 281 (1981).
67. See id. at 252, 285 S.E.2d at 282. Alimony pendente lite is alimony paid pending final
judgment of an action for alimony without divorce.
68. Id.
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caused by interlocutory appeals altered that court's previous dictionary defini-
tion of substantial right to allow for consideration of judicial economy. 69
It is clear that the state and federal applications of the substantial rights and
collateral order doctrines differ. If the federal doctrine, as applied in Abney, is
not constitutionally based, then it would appear not to be controlling in state
court. However, the constitutional overtones of the Supreme Court's statement
in Abney that a defendant's challenge must be reviewable before a final judgment
if he is to enjoy the "full protection" of the double jeopardy clause suggest that
the dissenting judge in Jones may have been correct in his assertion that Jones
does have a constitutional right to immediate appeal.70 A number of state
courts have found that Abney rests in part on constitutional grounds that are
applicable to both state and federal courts.7 1 Nevertheless, the Court's preface
to its discussion of the double jeopardy issue in Abney refutes such a conclusion.
The Court observed that "it is well settled that there is no constitutional right to
an appeal" 72 and noted that there was no right to appeal in criminal cases in the
federal courts until 1889. 73
Conceding that the right to appeal is purely a creature of statute, the dis-
senting judge in Jones nevertheless contended that no difference exists between
the "final decision" requirement of section 1291 and the "final judgment" re-
quirement of section 7A-27(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes.74 There-
fore, the dissenting judge argued that the constitutional principles of Abney are
equally applicable to North Carolina law.75 This argument has some merit be-
cause both the final judgment and the final decision requirement derive from the
same common-law root.76 Both requirements have the same practical effect of
preventing piecemeal review.77 Moreover, in the specific context of a criminal
case, a final decision and a final judgment would appear to mean the same thing:
the ultimate determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence. North Caro-
lina's final judgment requirement and the federal final decision requirement are
69. See Comment, supra note 30, at 873 (Stephenson "may foreshadow a trend to constrict the
path of interlocutory appeals by a re-evaluation of 'substantiality.' ").
70. The Court's assertion that the denial of Abney's interlocutory appeal would deny him full
protection of the double jeopardy clause can be read as a suggestion that the denial works to deprive
the defendant of rights guaranteed by the fifth amendment.
71. See State v. Janvrin, 121 N.H. 370, 430 A.2d 152 (1981) (citing Abney for the proposition
that interlocutory appeal is necessary prior to retrial in order to protect defendant's constitutional
right to be free from double jeopardy); State v. Berberian, 122 R.I. 693, 696, 411 A.2d 308, 309
(1980) ("[a]lthough the Court in [Abney] was construing statutory provisions. . . Mr. Chief Justice
Burger appeared to base the majority opinion of the Court at least in part on constitutional
grounds"; court found that Abney established constitutional right to appeal).
72. Abney, 431 U.S. at 656.
73. Id. at 656 & n.3.
74. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 418, 313 S.E.2d at 267 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
77. Compare Tridyn Indus., Inc. v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 296 N.C. 486, 487, 251 S.E.2d
443, 446 (1979) (" 'Appellate procedure is designed to eliminate the unnecessary delay and expense
of repeated fragmentary appeals, and to present the whole case for a single appeal from the final
judgment.' ") (quoting Raleigh v. Edwards, 234 N.C. 528, 529, 67 S.E.2d 669, 671 (1951)) with
Abney, 431 U.S. at 656 ("[Tlhere has been firm congressional policy against interlocutory or 'piece-
meal' appeals.").
1068 [Vol. 63
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
at odds on this point. Under North Carolina law, a final judgment is one that
"'disposes of the cause as to all the parties, leaving nothing to be judicially
determined between them in the trial court.' "78 Under the federal collateral
order doctrine, an order that does not dispose of the cause as to all the parties
and that does leave issues to be determined in the trial court still may be consid-
ered a final decision provided it meets the Cohen criteria. 79 As Justice Jackson
has noted, it was specifically a "final decision that Congress ha[d] made review-
able," and that "[w]hile a final judgment is always a final decision, there are
instances in which a final decision is not a final judgment."(0 Arguably Jones
embodies just such an instance. Indeed, one state court has found Abney's inter-
pretation of a final decision to be inapplicable to its own final judgment rule
based on Justice Jackson's reasoning. 8'
Before disposing of the case completely, it should be noted that Abney,
although not dispositive, is persuasive on the substantial rights issue. In the
course of determining whether an interlocutory denial of a motion to dismiss on
double jeopardy grounds was a final decision, the Court in Abney had to deter-
mine whether that denial "involved an important right which would be 'lost,
probably irreparably"' if review had to await a final judgment. 82 The standard
the Court used is strikingly similar to the standard applied in Jones; that is,
whether the order "deprives the appellant of a substantial right which he would
lose if the order is not reviewed before final judgment." 83 To say an important
right that would be lost if not reviewed before a final judgment is not the same as
a substantial right that would be lost if not reviewed before a final judgment is
illogical.
Although the Jones decision may be sound constitutionally, it reflects an
incomplete analysis of the North Carolina case law on the substantial rights
issue. The court initially compared the defendant's right to be free from double
jeopardy with the right to avoid a rehearing or trial.8 4 The court then cited two
civil cases, Tridyn Industries, Inc. v. American Mutual Insurance, Co.8 5 and Wa-
ters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc.,86 for the proposition that the right to avoid a
78. Atkins v. Beasley, 53 N.C. App. 33, 36, 279 S.E.2d 866, 869 (1981) (quoting Veazy v.
Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 361-62, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950)).
79. A collateral order by its very nature is an order that is collateral to the principal issue in the
case.
80. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 12 (1951) (separate opinion of Justice Jackson) (contending that
order denying reduction in bail should be regarded as final decision even though order does not
constitute final judgment, which, in a criminal trial, could be appealed only upon sentencing).
81. See State v. Fisher, 2 Kan. Ct. App. 353, 579 P.2d 167 (1978).
82. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
83. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 415, 313 S.E.2d at 266 (citing Blackwelder v. Department of Human
Resources, 60 N.C. App. 331, 299 S.E.2d 777 (1983)).
84. Id.
85. 296 N.C. 486, 251 S.E.2d 443 (1979). In Tridyn, the superior court judge had granted
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of defendant's liability to plaintiff under a
general insurance contract issued by defendant. The court reserved for trial the issue of damages.
The court of appeals found that the order granting partial summary judgment did not deprive the
defendant of any substantial right. The supreme court affirmed that the "case should be reviewed, if
at all, in its entirety and not piecemeal." Id. at 494, 251 S.E.2d at 449.
86. 294 N.C. 200, 240 S.E.2d 338 (1978). In Waters, the superior court judge had set aside an
order of summary judgment entered in favor of defendant on the ground that defendant had failed to
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rehearing or trial is not substantial.8 7 The court offered no explanation for its
conclusion that the rights asserted in those cases were comparable to those as-
serted by Jones. In fact, examination of the practical effects of both Tridyn and
Waters indicates that the rights asserted in those cases are not comparable to the
constitutional right asserted by Jones. The practical effect of the decision in
Tridyn was to subject defendant to a single trial on the issue of damages.88 The
practical effect of Waters, at worst, was to subject defendant to a single trial on
the merits and, at best, to a rehearing on a motion for summary judgment.8 9 In
neither case was there a danger that the defendant would have to endure the
"personal strain," "expense," or even the "embarrassment" of a second trial.90
Given that only a single trial was involved in both Tridyn and Waters, it is
difficult to see the relevance of either case to the issue in Jones. The issue in
Jones was not whether the defendant had a right to avoid an initial trial, but
whether the defendant had a right to avoid a second criminal trial. Reliance on
civil cases might be justified by the scarcity of North Carolina criminal cases
involving interlocutory appeals. 91 The court, however, chose the wrong civil
cases on which to rely; it failed to consider two cases that are relevant to the
second trial issue. In Oestreicher v. American National Stores, Inc. 92 the
Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the plaintiff had an immediate right
to appeal the decision to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment as to
some of plaintiff's claims when the effect would be to subject plaintiff to a possi-
ble second trial on these claims if the granting of the motion were ultimately
found to be erroneous. 93 Similarly, the court of appeals in Roberts v. Heffner 94
file notice of hearing in conjunction with its motion for summary judgment. The supreme court held
that such an order "setting aside without prejudice a summary judgment on the grounds of proce-
dural irregularity. . . is not immediately appealable." Id. at 208, 240 S.E.2d at 343.
87. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 416, 313 S.E.2d at 266.
88. See Comment, supra note 30, at 870-71 (citing Tridyn for the proposition that "orders for
partial summary judgment that merely determine the liabilities of parties while reserving the issue of
damages for trial do not affect substantial rights").
89. See Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law-Civil Procedure, 1978, 57 N.C.L.
REv. 891, 909 (1979) ("In Waters. . .denial of the right to appeal the setting aside of defendant's
summary judgment necessitates only a rehearing of the summary judgment and at most one trial.").
90. See Abney, 431 U.S. at 661.
91. Judge Johnson cited State v. Bryant, 280 N.C. 407, 185 S.E.2d 854 (1972), apparently the
only criminal case in North Carolina allowing an interlocutory appeal, in his dissent. See Jones, 67
N.C. App. at 419, 313 S.E.2d at 267 (Johnson, J., dissenting). In Bryant the North Carolina
Supreme Court found that an interlocutory order of a superior court judge authorizing police to
retain obscene material illegally seized from defendant's store was immediately appealable. The
court in Bryant found that a defendant may appeal immediately an order that "'may destroy or
impair or seriously imperil some substantial right of the appellant."' Bryant, 280 N.C. at 411, 185
S.E.2d at 856 (quoting State v. Childs, 265 N.C. 575, 578, 144 S.E.2d 653, 655 (1965) (quoting
Privette v. Privette, 230 N.C. 52, 53, 51 S.E.2d 925, 926 (1949))).
Childs, though denying the criminal defendant's interlocutory appeal of an order denying his
motion for change of venue to another county, implicitly authorizes interlocutory appeals in criminal
cases. See Childs, 265 N.C. at 578, 144 S.E.2d at 655. Bryant appears to be the only case in which
such an appeal has ever been granted.
92. 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797 (1976).
93. Id. at 130, 225 S.E.2d at 805. In Oestreicher, the trial court granted summary judgment for
defendant on two of plaintiff's three related claims. The supreme court held that plaintiff had a
substantial right to have all three claims litigated in one action; thus, the grant of summary judgment
was immediately appealable. Ifplaintiffhad been forced to try his remaining claim, and if, on appeal
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found that "the possibility of being forced to undergo two full trials on the mer-
its... makes it clear that the judgment in question works an injury to defend-
ants if not corrected before an appeal from a final judgment."95 As the dissent
in Jones noted, it seems illogical to hold that the mere possibility of facing a
second trial on the merits in a civil case involves a substantial right, while the
virtual certainty of facing a second criminal trial does not.96
The court in Jones also stated that there was no right to immediate appeal
from a motion to dismiss because "such refusal generally will not seriously im-
pair any right of the defendant that cannot be corrected upon appeal. .. .
There are two problems with this assertion. First, the case cited for this proposi-
tion, North Carolina Consumers Power, Inc. v. Duke Power Co.,98 recognized
that there is a right to immediate appeal from a refusal to dismiss a cause of
action for want of jurisdiction.99 Thus, the court's conclusion is based on faulty
authority. Second, regardless of the general effect of a refusal to dismiss an ac-
tion, such a refusal on the facts in Jones impairs a right of the defendant that
cannot be corrected on appeal. Even if a post-conviction appeal reverses an un-
fair conviction, the defendant still will have been unconstitutionally subjected to
a second trial. 100 When the right not to be subject to a second trial is the right
at issue, an appeal after that trial cannot erase the fact that a trial has already
occurred.
In response to this last contention, the court in Jones stated that defendant's
rights were adequately protected by his right to petition the court for prerogative
writs. 10 1 The fallacy of this statement is illustrated by the consequences of
Jones' appeal from his conviction in the third trial. Following the second trial
court's denial of Jones' motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, Jones
petitioned the North Carolina Supreme Court for writs of supersedeas and pro-
hibition, arguing that his retrial should be barred by double jeopardy princi-
ples.10 2 The court refused to exercise its discretion and denied the petitions.10 3
When Jones finally was allowed an appeal from the final judgment entered in his
third trial, his conviction was reversed. 1 4 In the words of the dissenting judge,
"Nothing in [the appellate files] indicates that the appellate courts considered
from a final judgment, the summary judgment against plaintiff's two other claims had been over-
turned, the plaintiff would have been forced to face a second trial on those two claims. Id.
94. 51 N.C. App. 646, 277 S.E.2d 446 (1981).
95. Id. at 650, 277 S.E.2d at 449. Defendants in Roberts appealed from a trial court order
dismissing their counterclaim for damages in excess of set-off to plaintiff's claims. The court of
appeals found that if the denial of the counterclaim in excess of the set-off amount were overturned
on defendant's appeal from a final judgment, defendants would be forced to undergo a second trial to
determine their full measure of damages.
96. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 418, 313 S.E.2d at 268 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 416, 313 S.E.2d at 266 (citing North Carolina Consumers Power, Inc. v. Duke Power
Co., 285 N.C. 434, 436, 206 S.E.2d 178, 180 (1974)).
98. 285 N.C. 434, 206 S.E.2d 178 (1974).
99. Id. at 438, 206 S.E.2d at 181.
100. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 418, 313 S.E.2d at 267 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 416, 313 S.E.2d at 266.
102. Id. at 414, 313 S.E.2d at 265.
103. Id.
104. See supra note 22.
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the merits of defendant's various petitions, despite clear evidence of patently
arbitrary judicial action." 10 5 The availability of prerogative writs did not offer
Jones adequate protection; it offered him no protection at all.
One commentator has suggested that in interpreting the substantial rights
language of section 1-277 North Carolina courts have shifted their focus from
the protection of individual rights to concern for judicial economy.10 6 It is con-
ceivable that the majority in Jones was haunted by the "specter of dilatory ap-
peals" when it endorsed an opinion that was founded neither in law nor in
logic. 107 Even assuming that concerns for adjudicatory efficiency may outweigh
considerations of constitutional rights in the context of appellate review, as a
practical matter the court's decision in Jones may not be justifiable even on
grounds of judicial economy. As a result of the denial of Jones' initial interlocu-
tory appeal, the North Carolina judicial system was burdened with two full trials
on the merits, two appeals, and countless petitions for discretionary writs, all of
which might have been avoided by the grant of defendant's original appeal. 108
Even disregarding the misuse of precedent and the possible absence of judi-
cial economy, the court's decision in Jones is not justifiable as a matter of fair-
ness. Regarding the concept of judicial economy, the Supreme Court has stated
that "the Bill of Rights . . . [was] designed to protect the fragile values of a
vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency."' 1 9 A number
of state courts have recognized the wisdom of this sentiment and have permitted
interlocutory appeals from orders denying motions to dismiss on double jeop-
ardy grounds. 011 The court in Jones, however, was unwilling to recognize or
give protection to the fragile value of freedom from double jeopardy despite the
North Carolina courts' protection of seemingly less substantial rights in the past,
In contrast to the result in Jones, the courts have singled out for protection as
"substantial rights" the rights affected by court orders directing the opening of a
defendant's safe,"' prohibiting the defendant from deposing an out-of-state ex-
pert witness,1 12 and requiring litigants to elect between disputed land boundaries
in a land title action.113 It is difficult to see how an order to open a safe com-
pares with an order that has the effect of requiring the defendant to defend a
second, or even third, criminal trial, in violation of that defendant's constitu-
tional rights.
The cases relied on by the majority do not address the issue presented in
105. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 418, 313 S.E.2d at 269 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
106. See Comment, supra note 30, at 857.
107. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 418, 313 S.E.2d at 268 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
108. This analysis assumes that the North Carolina Court of Appeals would have reached the
same conclusion had it allowed Jones' interlocutory appeal as it did when Jones appealed from the
final judgment entered in his third trial.
109. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
110. See, eg., Gray v. State, 36 Md. App. 708, 375 A.2d 31 (1977); State v. Janvrin, 121 N.H.
370, 430 A.2d 152 (1981); State v. Berberian, 122 R.I. 693, 411 A.2d 308 (1980).
111. See State ex rel. Hooks v. Flowers, 247 N.C. 558, 562, 101 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1958).
112. See Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick Corp., 291 N.C. 618, 625, 231 S.E.2d 597,
601 (1977).
113. See Jenkins v. Trantham, 244 N.C. 422, 427, 94 S.E.2d 311, 316 (1956).
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Jones. The court's suggestion that prerogative writs can protect a defendant
who has been forced to endure two unconstitutional trials, when his efforts to
procure such writs failed, is illogical. While the majority was correct in conclud-
ing that the Supreme Court's decision in Abney v. United States was not disposi-
tive, the logic of that decision, nevertheless, should have been persuasive.
Without an opportunity for immediate appeal of an order denying defendant's
motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, a defendant cannot enjoy the
"full protection" guaranteed by both the United States and the North Carolina
constitutions. Understandably, perhaps, criminal appeals are in disfavor. Con-
stitutional rights, however, should not be. The decision of the court of appeals
in State v. Jones should not stand.
KAREN E. RHEW
